humeDavid Hume ranks among the most influential philosophers in the field of the philosophy of religion. He criticized the standard proofs for God’s existence, traditional notions of God’s nature and divine governance, the connection between morality and religion, and the rationality of belief in miracles. He also advanced theories on the origin of popular religious beliefs, grounding such notions in human psychology rather than in rational argument or divine revelation. The larger aim of his critique was to disentangle philosophy from religion and thus allow philosophy to pursue its ends without either rational over-extension or psychological corruption. Although we find religious themes throughout Hume’s publications, the discussion here are largely restricted to six items: (1) “Of Miracles”, (2) “Of a Particular Providence and of a Future State”, (3) “The Natural History of Religion”, (4) Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, (5) “Of Suicide”, and, (6) “Of the Immortality of the Soul.”
1. Hume’s Place in Enlightenment Theories
During the Enlightenment, there were two pillars of traditional Christian belief: natural and revealed religion. One of the more routine charges brought against Hume by his early critics was that he sought to undermine both of these pillars.
Rooted in both ancient and medieval philosophy, natural religion involves knowledge of God drawn from nature through the use of logic and reason. Philosophers of the middle ages developed a variety of logical proofs regarding the existence and nature of God, three of which were especially influential in the centuries to come. First, the design argument (now called the teleological argument) infers the existence of a divine designer from the presence of natural order in the world. According to Aquinas’s version of the argument, things in nature exhibit a purpose – or final cause – and this implies that there is an intelligence that guides things. Second, a collection of proofs now called cosmological arguments contends that the causes (or motion, or contingency) in the world around us must have an origin that is uncaused (or unmoved, or necessary). The most sophisticated of these is a causal argument that distinguishes between two kinds of causal sequences, namely, those that occur over a period of time and those that occur simultaneously. A classic example of a temporal causal sequence is Abraham begetting Isaac, who in turn begets Jacob. An example of a simultaneous causal sequence is a hand that moves a stick that in turn moves a stone, all at the same time. Proponents of the causal argument held that it is theoretically possible for a temporal causal sequence of events to trace back through time to infinity past. However, they argued, simultaneous causal sequences must terminate in a first cause. The point of the argument is that God is required at each moment to sustain the existence of the world. A third argument – now dubbed the ontological argument – maintains that the greatest possible being must exist since it is logically contradictory to assert otherwise.
All three of these arguments were modified and strengthened during the 17th and 18th centuries. The design argument was bolstered with the ever-growing body of scientific knowledge, particularly in the fields of biology and astronomy. Parallels were pointed out between intricate mechanisms of the cosmos and objects of human design, such as watches. Four especially influential works in this genre were John Ray’s The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of the Creation (1691), Richard Bentley’s A Confutation of Atheism from the Origin and Frame of the World (1692), William Derham’s Physico-Theology (1713) and Derham’s Astro-Theology (1715). Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Samuel Clarke presented a more precise and somewhat different causal argument. Like their medieval predecessors, they agreed that it is theoretically possible for temporal causal sequences to trace back to infinity past. Nevertheless, they argued, an important fact still needs to be explained: the fact that this infinite temporal sequence of causal events exists at all. God, then, is the necessary cause of the whole series. Hume appears to have been unfamiliar with the medieval versions of the theistic proofs, and, like most of his British contemporaries, does not even discuss the ontological argument. His most direct source for the design and causal arguments were probably Cicero and the more contemporary discussions by Clarke and others.
Revealed religion, the second pillar of traditional Christian belief, involves knowledge of God contained in revelation, particularly the Bible. During the Enlightenment, religious writers continually defended the veracity of the Christian scriptures. Apologists argued that the biblical prophesies and miracles were true instances of God’s intervention in earthly affairs, and this intervention confirmed the Bible’s message of salvation. Challenged by voyagers’ accounts of strange religions in the far corners of the world, some apologists argued further that Christianity was not just another religion. Instead, they believed, Christianity contains God’s true revealed message, and other idolatrous religions are the result of human weakness or perhaps even demonic influence. Gerardus Joannes Vossius’s De Theologia Gentili (1641) is the most notable defense of this kind.
In spite of these valiant efforts to defend the Christian faith, several philosophers and theologians chiseled away at the notions of both natural and revealed religion. We know that Hume was acquainted with many of these criticisms, and Hume’s respondents quickly associated his views with those of his forerunners.
Natural religion came under attack from two camps. First, within the Christian mainstream itself, religious fideists – particularly from the Augustinian tradition – argued that questions of God’s existence and nature are matters of religious faith, and not matters of human reason. This is because of both the limits of human reason and the infinitely incomprehensible nature of God himself. French philosopher Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) boldly makes this point here:
By faith we know God’s existence. In the glorious state of heaven we will know his nature. … If there is a God he is infinitely incomprehensible, since, having neither parts nor limits, he has no proportion to us. We are then incapable of knowing either what he is, or whether he is. This being true, who will dare to undertake to resolve this question? …Who, then, will blame those Christians who are not able to give a reason for their belief insofar as they profess a religion for which they can give no reason? [Thoughts]
Scotland in Hume’s time was influenced by Calvinistic fideism, which owed much of its theoretical position to Renaissance Augustinianism. The other attack on natural religion came from philosophical skeptics who – inspired by Sextus Empiricus and the Pyrrhonian septical tradition – pointed out the bankruptcy of human reason. No arguments, they contended, are immune from criticism, including theistic proofs. This skeptical conviction was especially strong among the French writers Michel Montaigne (1533-1592), Francois de la Mothe le Vayer (1588-1669), and Pierre Bayle (1647-1706). Like traditional fideists, many of these modern sceptics also held that questions of God’s existence were matters of faith, not reason. Bayle, in fact, argues that skepticism is a wonderful preparation for religious faith:
If a person is first convinced that he can expect no satisfaction from his philosophical studies, he will be more inclined to pray to God; he will ask God for the conviction of the truths which he ought to believe, rather than flattering himself with the success of his reasoning and disputing. It is therefore a welcome inclination to faith to know the defects of reason. ["Pyrrho", Dictionary]
Reassessments of revealed religion came in varying degrees from writers connected with non- traditional theological movements. Latitudinarianism – a movement within the Church of England – advocated religious toleration and attempted to hold a middle ground between religious dogmatism and scepticism. Although they were believers in biblical miracles, Latitudinarians such as John Tillotson (1730-1694) and Edward Stillingfleet (1635-1699) established criteria for distinguishing true miracles from false ones, particularly alleged miracles within the Catholic tradition. These criteria were influential in subsequent discussions of miracles. Perhaps the strongest attacks on revealed religion came from Deism, a heterogeneous movement which held that God created the universe, but thereafter left it alone without further interfering in the established course of nature. Deists had a notorious reputation for denying that God intervened through revealed texts such as the Bible or through miraculous suspensions of laws of nature. Whereas Latitudinarians tried to distinguish the Gospel miracles from Catholic ones, deists such as Thomas Chubb (1679-1747) often blurred the distinction. Charles Blount (1654-1693) argues similarly that pagan miracles have the same credibility as the Christian miracles. Their point was either to discredit biblical miracles by association, or to at least show that no religion has exclusive claim to miracles.
In addition to attacks on revealed religion from within these religious movements, some more independent philosophers also joined in the assault. Benedict de Spinoza (1632-1677) argues that the very facts attested in miracles count against them: “if anyone asserted that God acts in contravention to the laws of nature, he, ipso facto, would be compelled to assert that God acted against his own nature – an evident absurdity” (Tractatus Theologico- Politicus, Sect. 6). A similar attack appears in the posthumously published philosophical essays of Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke (1678-1751) where he argues that miracles “are incredible, because [they are] contrary to all experience, and to the established course of Nature” (Philosophical Works, 1754, Vol. 5, pp. 99-102). Andrew Michael Ramsay (1686- 1743), in his posthumously published Philosophical Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion (1748-1749), suggests that, to someone outside the Christian faith, the Biblical miracle accounts are inherently counter-intuitive.
2. Hume’s Writings on Religion
To avoid being fined, imprisoned, or worse, critics of religion during Hume’s time needed to express themselves cautiously. Sometimes this involved placing controversial views in the mouth of a character in a dialogue. Other times it involved adopting the persona of a deist or fideist as a means of concealing a more extreme religious skepticism. Hume used all of the rhetorical devices at his disposal, and left it to his readers to decode his most controversial conclusions.
His first sustained attack on natural and revealed religion appears in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), specifically in two essays, “Of Miracles”, and “Of a Particular Providence and of a Future State.” “Of Miracles” contains an assortment of attacks on the belief in miracles; the thrust of the essay is that it is unreasonable for anyone to believe in testimonies involving miraculous violations of laws of nature. The first of this two- part essay contains the argument for which Hume is most famous: uniform experience of natural law outweighs the testimony of any alleged miracle. We might imagine a scale with two balancing pans. In the first pan we place the strongest evidence in support of the occurrence of a miracle. In the second we place our life-long experience of consistent laws of nature. According to Hume, the second pan will always outweigh the first. Regardless of how strong the testimony is in favor of a given miracle, it can never come close to counterbalancing the overwhelming experience of unvaried laws of nature. Thus, proportioning one’s belief to the evidence, the wise person must reject the weaker evidence concerning the alleged miracle. In a 1737 letter to Henry Home, Hume states that he intended to include a discussion of miracles in his Treatise of Human Nature (1739-1740), but ultimately left it out for fear of offending readers. It is probably this main argument to which Hume refers.
The second part of “Of Miracles” presents a potpourri of criticisms. Hume begins by offering four factors that count against the credibility of most miracle testimonies: (1) witnesses of miracles typically lack integrity; (2) we have a propensity to sensationalize, which prompts us to uncritically perpetuate miracle stories; (3) miracle testimonies abound in barbarous nations; and (4) miracles support rival religious systems and thus discredit each other. Like Chubb and Blount, Hume also discusses three non-biblical miracles that are supported by reliable testimony – one from ancient Rome and two recent Catholic miracles. Although they are backed by strong testimony, Hume argues that we nevertheless reject these alleged miracles since they are contrary to our consistent experience of laws of nature. He concludes noting that theologians invite problems when they attempt to ground their religion in miracles. Christianity, he concludes, certainly requires belief in miracles, but such belief should involve an act of faith and not reason.
As Hume’s “Of Miracles” was an attack on revealed religion, he followed this with an attack on natural religion in the essay “Of a Particular Providence and of a Future State,” which was originally titled “Of the Practical Consequences of Natural Religion.” The essay presents a fictional conversation in which two characters examine the design argument. The characters give three key criticisms. First,
our knowledge of God as creator is restricted to the effects that we see in his creation; since the world (the effect) is imperfect, we cannot conclude that God (the cause) is perfect. Second, justice in the universe is restricted to the imperfect justice that we see around us. Third, the singular and unparalleled nature of the universe prevents us from making analogical inferences about the creator.
In 1757 Hume published a work titled Four Dissertations, the first and longest essay of which was “The Natural History of Religion.” The essay is one of the first attempts to explain the causes of religious belief solely in terms of psychological and sociological factors. We might see the “Natural History” as an answer to a challenge, such as the sort that William Adams poses here in his attack on Hume’s “Of Miracles”:
Whence could the religion and laws of this people [i.e., the Jews] so far exceed those of the wisest Heathens, and come out at once, in their first infancy, thus perfect and entire; when all human systems are found to grow up by degrees, and to ripen, after many improvements; into perfection? [An Essay, Part 2]
According to Adams, only divine intervention can account for the sophistication of the ancient Jewish religion. In the “Natural History,” though, Hume offers an alternative explanation, and one that is grounded solely in human nature. His critics saw this work as an attack on revealed religion, since it brushes aside the contention that religious belief hinges on God’s direct involvement within human history. The work may be divided into three parts. In the first part (Sections 1 and 4), Hume argues that polytheism, and not monotheism, was the original religion of primitive humans. Monotheism, he believes, was only a later development that emerged with the progress of various societies. The standard theory in Judeo-Christian theology was that early humans first believed in a single God, but as religious corruption crept in, people lapsed into polytheism. Hume was the first writer to systematically defend the position of original polytheism. In the second part (Sections 2-3, 5-8), Hume establishes the psychological principles that give rise to popular religious belief. His thesis is that natural instincts – such as fear and the propensity to adulate – are the true causes of popular religious belief, and not divine intervention or rational argument. The third part of this work (Sections 9-15) compares various aspects of polytheism with monotheism, showing that one is no more superior than the other. Both contain points of absurdity. From this he concludes that we should suspend belief on the entire subject of religious truth.
Around the same time that Hume was composing his “Natural History of Religion” he was also working on his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, which appeared in print two decades later, after his death. The work is perhaps Hume’s greatest philosophical writing, both in terms of content and composition. There are three principal characters in the Dialogues. A character named Cleanthes defends an a posteriori design argument for God’s existence. Next, a character named Demea defends an a priori casual argument for God’s existence, particularly Leibniz’s and Clarke’s version. Finally, a character named Philo is a skeptic who argues against both a posteriori and a priori proofs. Philo offers a stream of criticisms against the design argument, many of which are now standard in discussions of the issue. For Philo, the design argument is based on a faulty analogy: we do not know whether the order in nature was the result of design, since, unlike our experience with the creation of machines, we did not witness the formation of the world. The vastness of the universe also weakens any comparison with human artifacts. Although the universe is orderly here, it may be chaotic elsewhere. Similarly, if intelligent design is exhibited only in a small fraction of the universe, then we cannot say that it is the productive force of the whole universe. Philo also contends that natural design may be accounted for by nature alone, insofar as matter may contain within itself a principle of order. And even if the design of the universe is of divine origin, we are not justified in concluding that this divine cause is a single, all powerful, or all good being. As to the causal argument, Philo argues that once we have a sufficient explanation for each particular fact in the infinite sequence of facts, it makes no sense to inquire about the origin of the collection of these facts. That is, once we adequately account for each individual fact, this constitutes a sufficient explanation of the whole collection.
In 1755 Hume’s essays “Of Suicide” and “Of the Immortality of the Soul” were printed along with the “Natural History of Religion” in a book titled Five Dissertations. When pre-release copies of Five Dissertations provoked controversy among influential readers, Hume and his publisher Andrew Millar agreed to have the two essays physically removed from the printed copies. They were replaced with a more innocent essay titled “Of the Standard of Taste,” and the book of essays appeared in 1757 under the title Four Dissertations. Rumors about the two withdrawn essays circulated for years, and clandestine copies appeared anonymously in French (1770) and later in English (1777). In 1783 a reprint of the 1777 version was published more openly, and this time with Hume’s name attached. Along with Hume’s two essays, the anonymous editor of the 1783 edition included his own critical notes to Hume’s two pieces, and excerpts from Rousseau’s La Nouvelle Heloise on the subject of suicide. “Of Suicide” defends the moral permissibility of suicide by arguing that it does not violate our duties to God, oneself, or others. “Of the Immortality of the Soul” disputes a series of metaphysical, moral, and physical arguments for the soul’s immortality. Pages of the original two essays as they were printed in Five Dissertations are in the possession of the National Library of Scotland. These contain nineteen corrections in Hume’s hand and are his final surviving revisions of the essays. He sent the revised pages to his printer William Strahan, who then suppressed them. It is only since the 20th century that these revisions appear in editions of the two essays.
3. Overview of Early Responses to Hume’s Writings on Religion
Only a few of Hume’s early respondents were active philosophers; most, instead, were theologians who believed that Hume posed a real threat to religion and they accordingly responded as defenders of their faith. These theologians fall into several groups. First, an initial group were Anglican clergy or members of that theological camp. Anthony Ellys, Thomas Rutherforth, Owen Manning, William Adams, and William Samuel Powell were clergy of the Church of England; John Douglas was a Scottish Episcopalian cleric, and Philip Skelton was a cleric of the Church of Ireland. William Warburton was a polemicist for this group. Second, there were dissenters who were members of non-Anglican church bodies in England and Ireland. Most of these were non-Calvinistic and classified as rational dissenters. William Rose was a layman in this group. John Leland, Richard Price, Joseph Priestley, and Thomas Cogan were ministers at different positions along the theological spectrum. Third, there were ministers of the Church of Scotland – a Presbyterian rather than an Episcopalian body. Henry Home was a layman in this group. George Anderson, George Campbell, and James Oswald were ministers.
The early responses to Hume’s writings on religion differ from early responses to his metaphysical and moral writings in three key ways. First, there are many more responses to his religious writings, undoubtedly because of the perceived threat that they posed. Second, critics of Hume’s other writings frequently misunderstood his views; however, as professionally trained theologians, the respondents to Hume’s religious writings typically had a good grasp of his arguments, even if they did not offer convincing refutations. Third, although all early responses to Hume are intrinsically interesting, the responses to his religious writings are invaluable for helping decipher Hume’s frequently concealed attacks on religion. Having the advantage of living during Hume’s time, early critics understood Hume’s implications better than we might today. And, in their responses, they routinely interpret Hume’s hidden meaning.
The first early response to “Of Miracles” appeared in 1749 by Philip Skelton, and a steady stream of responses has continued to the present time. The longest of these were by William Adams (1752), John Leland (1755), and George Campbell (1762). Although Hume avoided responding to his critics as a matter of principle, he nevertheless kept track of printed criticisms as they appeared. In the last decade of his life he wrote “I cou’d cover the Floor of a large Room with Books and Pamphlets wrote against me.” His interest in critical responses to “Of Miracles” in particular started early. Writing to his friend Robert Wallace in 1753, Hume stated that he saw three pamphlets that attacked “Of Miracles,” two of which he owned. Some time later, Hume told Richard Kirwan that “twenty-two answers had been made [to "Of Miracles"], hinting, that if any of them had been satisfactory any other would have been judged superfluous” (“Remarks”, included below). In addition to works devoted exclusively to “Of Miracles”, critics of Hume’s other writings on religion routinely included brief attacks on that essay. Some critics attacked a single point in his essay, whereas others carefully dissected the work sentence by sentence. The respondents were typically acquainted with the critiques of Hume that appeared prior to their own, and they often stated their intention to offer a new angle in their attack.
The principal objections raised by respondents regarding “Of Miracles” Part 1 are these. (1) Hume’s use of the word “experience” is ambiguous, sometimes meaning an individual’s private experience, other times meaning human collective experience. (2) Our limited experience of natural laws does not make it unreasonable to believe that God altered natural laws. (3) Miraculous intervention is reasonable to believe when we recognise God’s existence, God’s nature, and God’s interest in redeeming humanity. (4) Contrary to Hume, it is perfectly reasonable for the Indian prince to believe that water freezes, even though his limited experience suggests otherwise. (5) Experience of natural laws is not as weighty as Hume maintains since some commonly believed laws are overturned by a single experiment. (6) Strong testimony of miracles can in fact outweigh our experience of consistent natural laws. (7) Hume misconstrues the notion of probability when stating that we “subtract” contrary evidences from each other. (8) Hume’s argument tells us only that miracles are highly unusual, which believers in miracles already acknowledge.
Concerning Part 2, these are the main objections. (1) The New Testament miracles were not in fact reported by ignorant people in a barbarous nation. (2) Miracle testimonies from rival religions do not nullify each other; upon examination, the New Testament miracles are the only ones that are credible. (3) Contrary to Hume, Muhammad never claimed to have performed miracles. (4) The alleged miracle done by Vespasian is not credible since it was done in front of gullible people with a clear political aim. (5) The alleged miracle at Saragossa was not thoroughly investigated by Cardinal de Retz, and it is likely that the man in question had a wooden leg. (6) Hume exaggerates the number and nature of the alleged miracles at the tomb of the Abbé De Pâris; the most notable ones were either frauds or the result of natural healings, as exposed by De Voeux in his Lettres sur les Miracles (1735) and Critique Generale du livre de Mr. de Montgeron (1741).
Early responses to “Of a Particular Providence” were more modest in number, and written by some of Hume’s most notable critics: Henry Home (1751), George Anderson (1753), George Psalmanazar (1753), John Leland (1755), James Beattie (1770), James Oswald (1772), Joseph Priestley (1780), and Archibald Arthur (1803). Their main objection was with Hume’s claim that our knowledge of God as creator is limited to the effects that we see in the creation. When Hume’s “Natural History of Religion” appeared in 1757, four reviews of that work shortly followed, most of which found the work to be less original than Hume’s other writings. The most sustained critiques of the “Natural History of Religion” were written by Caleb Fleming (1757), William Warburton (1757), Thomas Stona (1758), Voltaire (1764-1769), and Duncan Shaw (1776). Most of these writers focused on Hume’s claim that polytheism was the original religion of humanity.
When Hume’s Dialogues was published in 1777, at least six reviews of that work appeared, the majority of which were very critical. Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, books, pamphlets and journal articles appeared that analyzed different parts of the Dialogues, but the most systematic studies of that work only appeared later in the 20th century. The early responses to the Dialogues presented in this volume are by Thomas Hayter (1780), Joseph Priestley (1780), Joseph Milner (1781), John Ogilvie (1783), Hugh Hamilton (1784), George Horne (1784), Archibald Arthur (1803), and Alexander Crombie (1829). “Of Suicide” and “Of the Immortality of the Soul” were openly published in 1783 with Hume’s name attached, and most respondents were shocked by these essays. In fact, we find here some of the most negative comments about Hume that have appeared in print. Four review articles attacked the work, and parts of the essays were analyzed by the anonymous An Essay on the Immortality of the Soul (1784), and Charles Moore’s A Full Inquiry into the Subject of Suicide (1790). The most systematic study of “Of Suicide” was presented by George Horne (1784).
1. Hume’s Place in Enlightenment Theories
During the Enlightenment, there were two pillars of traditional Christian belief: natural and revealed religion. One of the more routine charges brought against Hume by his early critics was that he sought to undermine both of these pillars.
Rooted in both ancient and medieval philosophy, natural religion involves knowledge of God drawn from nature through the use of logic and reason. Philosophers of the middle ages developed a variety of logical proofs regarding the existence and nature of God, three of which were especially influential in the centuries to come. First, the design argument (now called the teleological argument) infers the existence of a divine designer from the presence of natural order in the world. According to Aquinas’s version of the argument, things in nature exhibit a purpose – or final cause – and this implies that there is an intelligence that guides things. Second, a collection of proofs now called cosmological arguments contends that the causes (or motion, or contingency) in the world around us must have an origin that is uncaused (or unmoved, or necessary). The most sophisticated of these is a causal argument that distinguishes between two kinds of causal sequences, namely, those that occur over a period of time and those that occur simultaneously. A classic example of a temporal causal sequence is Abraham begetting Isaac, who in turn begets Jacob. An example of a simultaneous causal sequence is a hand that moves a stick that in turn moves a stone, all at the same time. Proponents of the causal argument held that it is theoretically possible for a temporal causal sequence of events to trace back through time to infinity past. However, they argued, simultaneous causal sequences must terminate in a first cause. The point of the argument is that God is required at each moment to sustain the existence of the world. A third argument – now dubbed the ontological argument – maintains that the greatest possible being must exist since it is logically contradictory to assert otherwise.
All three of these arguments were modified and strengthened during the 17th and 18th centuries. The design argument was bolstered with the ever-growing body of scientific knowledge, particularly in the fields of biology and astronomy. Parallels were pointed out between intricate mechanisms of the cosmos and objects of human design, such as watches. Four especially influential works in this genre were John Ray’s The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of the Creation (1691), Richard Bentley’s A Confutation of Atheism from the Origin and Frame of the World (1692), William Derham’s Physico-Theology (1713) and Derham’s Astro-Theology (1715). Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Samuel Clarke presented a more precise and somewhat different causal argument. Like their medieval predecessors, they agreed that it is theoretically possible for temporal causal sequences to trace back to infinity past. Nevertheless, they argued, an important fact still needs to be explained: the fact that this infinite temporal sequence of causal events exists at all. God, then, is the necessary cause of the whole series. Hume appears to have been unfamiliar with the medieval versions of the theistic proofs, and, like most of his British contemporaries, does not even discuss the ontological argument. His most direct source for the design and causal arguments were probably Cicero and the more contemporary discussions by Clarke and others.
Revealed religion, the second pillar of traditional Christian belief, involves knowledge of God contained in revelation, particularly the Bible. During the Enlightenment, religious writers continually defended the veracity of the Christian scriptures. Apologists argued that the biblical prophesies and miracles were true instances of God’s intervention in earthly affairs, and this intervention confirmed the Bible’s message of salvation. Challenged by voyagers’ accounts of strange religions in the far corners of the world, some apologists argued further that Christianity was not just another religion. Instead, they believed, Christianity contains God’s true revealed message, and other idolatrous religions are the result of human weakness or perhaps even demonic influence. Gerardus Joannes Vossius’s De Theologia Gentili (1641) is the most notable defense of this kind.
In spite of these valiant efforts to defend the Christian faith, several philosophers and theologians chiseled away at the notions of both natural and revealed religion. We know that Hume was acquainted with many of these criticisms, and Hume’s respondents quickly associated his views with those of his forerunners.
Natural religion came under attack from two camps. First, within the Christian mainstream itself, religious fideists – particularly from the Augustinian tradition – argued that questions of God’s existence and nature are matters of religious faith, and not matters of human reason. This is because of both the limits of human reason and the infinitely incomprehensible nature of God himself. French philosopher Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) boldly makes this point here:
By faith we know God’s existence. In the glorious state of heaven we will know his nature. … If there is a God he is infinitely incomprehensible, since, having neither parts nor limits, he has no proportion to us. We are then incapable of knowing either what he is, or whether he is. This being true, who will dare to undertake to resolve this question? …Who, then, will blame those Christians who are not able to give a reason for their belief insofar as they profess a religion for which they can give no reason? [Thoughts]
Scotland in Hume’s time was influenced by Calvinistic fideism, which owed much of its theoretical position to Renaissance Augustinianism. The other attack on natural religion came from philosophical skeptics who – inspired by Sextus Empiricus and the Pyrrhonian septical tradition – pointed out the bankruptcy of human reason. No arguments, they contended, are immune from criticism, including theistic proofs. This skeptical conviction was especially strong among the French writers Michel Montaigne (1533-1592), Francois de la Mothe le Vayer (1588-1669), and Pierre Bayle (1647-1706). Like traditional fideists, many of these modern sceptics also held that questions of God’s existence were matters of faith, not reason. Bayle, in fact, argues that skepticism is a wonderful preparation for religious faith:
If a person is first convinced that he can expect no satisfaction from his philosophical studies, he will be more inclined to pray to God; he will ask God for the conviction of the truths which he ought to believe, rather than flattering himself with the success of his reasoning and disputing. It is therefore a welcome inclination to faith to know the defects of reason. ["Pyrrho", Dictionary]
Reassessments of revealed religion came in varying degrees from writers connected with non- traditional theological movements. Latitudinarianism – a movement within the Church of England – advocated religious toleration and attempted to hold a middle ground between religious dogmatism and scepticism. Although they were believers in biblical miracles, Latitudinarians such as John Tillotson (1730-1694) and Edward Stillingfleet (1635-1699) established criteria for distinguishing true miracles from false ones, particularly alleged miracles within the Catholic tradition. These criteria were influential in subsequent discussions of miracles. Perhaps the strongest attacks on revealed religion came from Deism, a heterogeneous movement which held that God created the universe, but thereafter left it alone without further interfering in the established course of nature. Deists had a notorious reputation for denying that God intervened through revealed texts such as the Bible or through miraculous suspensions of laws of nature. Whereas Latitudinarians tried to distinguish the Gospel miracles from Catholic ones, deists such as Thomas Chubb (1679-1747) often blurred the distinction. Charles Blount (1654-1693) argues similarly that pagan miracles have the same credibility as the Christian miracles. Their point was either to discredit biblical miracles by association, or to at least show that no religion has exclusive claim to miracles.
In addition to attacks on revealed religion from within these religious movements, some more independent philosophers also joined in the assault. Benedict de Spinoza (1632-1677) argues that the very facts attested in miracles count against them: “if anyone asserted that God acts in contravention to the laws of nature, he, ipso facto, would be compelled to assert that God acted against his own nature – an evident absurdity” (Tractatus Theologico- Politicus, Sect. 6). A similar attack appears in the posthumously published philosophical essays of Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke (1678-1751) where he argues that miracles “are incredible, because [they are] contrary to all experience, and to the established course of Nature” (Philosophical Works, 1754, Vol. 5, pp. 99-102). Andrew Michael Ramsay (1686- 1743), in his posthumously published Philosophical Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion (1748-1749), suggests that, to someone outside the Christian faith, the Biblical miracle accounts are inherently counter-intuitive.
2. Hume’s Writings on Religion
To avoid being fined, imprisoned, or worse, critics of religion during Hume’s time needed to express themselves cautiously. Sometimes this involved placing controversial views in the mouth of a character in a dialogue. Other times it involved adopting the persona of a deist or fideist as a means of concealing a more extreme religious skepticism. Hume used all of the rhetorical devices at his disposal, and left it to his readers to decode his most controversial conclusions.
His first sustained attack on natural and revealed religion appears in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), specifically in two essays, “Of Miracles”, and “Of a Particular Providence and of a Future State.” “Of Miracles” contains an assortment of attacks on the belief in miracles; the thrust of the essay is that it is unreasonable for anyone to believe in testimonies involving miraculous violations of laws of nature. The first of this two- part essay contains the argument for which Hume is most famous: uniform experience of natural law outweighs the testimony of any alleged miracle. We might imagine a scale with two balancing pans. In the first pan we place the strongest evidence in support of the occurrence of a miracle. In the second we place our life-long experience of consistent laws of nature. According to Hume, the second pan will always outweigh the first. Regardless of how strong the testimony is in favor of a given miracle, it can never come close to counterbalancing the overwhelming experience of unvaried laws of nature. Thus, proportioning one’s belief to the evidence, the wise person must reject the weaker evidence concerning the alleged miracle. In a 1737 letter to Henry Home, Hume states that he intended to include a discussion of miracles in his Treatise of Human Nature (1739-1740), but ultimately left it out for fear of offending readers. It is probably this main argument to which Hume refers.
The second part of “Of Miracles” presents a potpourri of criticisms. Hume begins by offering four factors that count against the credibility of most miracle testimonies: (1) witnesses of miracles typically lack integrity; (2) we have a propensity to sensationalize, which prompts us to uncritically perpetuate miracle stories; (3) miracle testimonies abound in barbarous nations; and (4) miracles support rival religious systems and thus discredit each other. Like Chubb and Blount, Hume also discusses three non-biblical miracles that are supported by reliable testimony – one from ancient Rome and two recent Catholic miracles. Although they are backed by strong testimony, Hume argues that we nevertheless reject these alleged miracles since they are contrary to our consistent experience of laws of nature. He concludes noting that theologians invite problems when they attempt to ground their religion in miracles. Christianity, he concludes, certainly requires belief in miracles, but such belief should involve an act of faith and not reason.
As Hume’s “Of Miracles” was an attack on revealed religion, he followed this with an attack on natural religion in the essay “Of a Particular Providence and of a Future State,” which was originally titled “Of the Practical Consequences of Natural Religion.” The essay presents a fictional conversation in which two characters examine the design argument. The characters give three key criticisms. First,
our knowledge of God as creator is restricted to the effects that we see in his creation; since the world (the effect) is imperfect, we cannot conclude that God (the cause) is perfect. Second, justice in the universe is restricted to the imperfect justice that we see around us. Third, the singular and unparalleled nature of the universe prevents us from making analogical inferences about the creator.
In 1757 Hume published a work titled Four Dissertations, the first and longest essay of which was “The Natural History of Religion.” The essay is one of the first attempts to explain the causes of religious belief solely in terms of psychological and sociological factors. We might see the “Natural History” as an answer to a challenge, such as the sort that William Adams poses here in his attack on Hume’s “Of Miracles”:
Whence could the religion and laws of this people [i.e., the Jews] so far exceed those of the wisest Heathens, and come out at once, in their first infancy, thus perfect and entire; when all human systems are found to grow up by degrees, and to ripen, after many improvements; into perfection? [An Essay, Part 2]
According to Adams, only divine intervention can account for the sophistication of the ancient Jewish religion. In the “Natural History,” though, Hume offers an alternative explanation, and one that is grounded solely in human nature. His critics saw this work as an attack on revealed religion, since it brushes aside the contention that religious belief hinges on God’s direct involvement within human history. The work may be divided into three parts. In the first part (Sections 1 and 4), Hume argues that polytheism, and not monotheism, was the original religion of primitive humans. Monotheism, he believes, was only a later development that emerged with the progress of various societies. The standard theory in Judeo-Christian theology was that early humans first believed in a single God, but as religious corruption crept in, people lapsed into polytheism. Hume was the first writer to systematically defend the position of original polytheism. In the second part (Sections 2-3, 5-8), Hume establishes the psychological principles that give rise to popular religious belief. His thesis is that natural instincts – such as fear and the propensity to adulate – are the true causes of popular religious belief, and not divine intervention or rational argument. The third part of this work (Sections 9-15) compares various aspects of polytheism with monotheism, showing that one is no more superior than the other. Both contain points of absurdity. From this he concludes that we should suspend belief on the entire subject of religious truth.
Around the same time that Hume was composing his “Natural History of Religion” he was also working on his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, which appeared in print two decades later, after his death. The work is perhaps Hume’s greatest philosophical writing, both in terms of content and composition. There are three principal characters in the Dialogues. A character named Cleanthes defends an a posteriori design argument for God’s existence. Next, a character named Demea defends an a priori casual argument for God’s existence, particularly Leibniz’s and Clarke’s version. Finally, a character named Philo is a skeptic who argues against both a posteriori and a priori proofs. Philo offers a stream of criticisms against the design argument, many of which are now standard in discussions of the issue. For Philo, the design argument is based on a faulty analogy: we do not know whether the order in nature was the result of design, since, unlike our experience with the creation of machines, we did not witness the formation of the world. The vastness of the universe also weakens any comparison with human artifacts. Although the universe is orderly here, it may be chaotic elsewhere. Similarly, if intelligent design is exhibited only in a small fraction of the universe, then we cannot say that it is the productive force of the whole universe. Philo also contends that natural design may be accounted for by nature alone, insofar as matter may contain within itself a principle of order. And even if the design of the universe is of divine origin, we are not justified in concluding that this divine cause is a single, all powerful, or all good being. As to the causal argument, Philo argues that once we have a sufficient explanation for each particular fact in the infinite sequence of facts, it makes no sense to inquire about the origin of the collection of these facts. That is, once we adequately account for each individual fact, this constitutes a sufficient explanation of the whole collection.
In 1755 Hume’s essays “Of Suicide” and “Of the Immortality of the Soul” were printed along with the “Natural History of Religion” in a book titled Five Dissertations. When pre-release copies of Five Dissertations provoked controversy among influential readers, Hume and his publisher Andrew Millar agreed to have the two essays physically removed from the printed copies. They were replaced with a more innocent essay titled “Of the Standard of Taste,” and the book of essays appeared in 1757 under the title Four Dissertations. Rumors about the two withdrawn essays circulated for years, and clandestine copies appeared anonymously in French (1770) and later in English (1777). In 1783 a reprint of the 1777 version was published more openly, and this time with Hume’s name attached. Along with Hume’s two essays, the anonymous editor of the 1783 edition included his own critical notes to Hume’s two pieces, and excerpts from Rousseau’s La Nouvelle Heloise on the subject of suicide. “Of Suicide” defends the moral permissibility of suicide by arguing that it does not violate our duties to God, oneself, or others. “Of the Immortality of the Soul” disputes a series of metaphysical, moral, and physical arguments for the soul’s immortality. Pages of the original two essays as they were printed in Five Dissertations are in the possession of the National Library of Scotland. These contain nineteen corrections in Hume’s hand and are his final surviving revisions of the essays. He sent the revised pages to his printer William Strahan, who then suppressed them. It is only since the 20th century that these revisions appear in editions of the two essays.
3. Overview of Early Responses to Hume’s Writings on Religion
Only a few of Hume’s early respondents were active philosophers; most, instead, were theologians who believed that Hume posed a real threat to religion and they accordingly responded as defenders of their faith. These theologians fall into several groups. First, an initial group were Anglican clergy or members of that theological camp. Anthony Ellys, Thomas Rutherforth, Owen Manning, William Adams, and William Samuel Powell were clergy of the Church of England; John Douglas was a Scottish Episcopalian cleric, and Philip Skelton was a cleric of the Church of Ireland. William Warburton was a polemicist for this group. Second, there were dissenters who were members of non-Anglican church bodies in England and Ireland. Most of these were non-Calvinistic and classified as rational dissenters. William Rose was a layman in this group. John Leland, Richard Price, Joseph Priestley, and Thomas Cogan were ministers at different positions along the theological spectrum. Third, there were ministers of the Church of Scotland – a Presbyterian rather than an Episcopalian body. Henry Home was a layman in this group. George Anderson, George Campbell, and James Oswald were ministers.
The early responses to Hume’s writings on religion differ from early responses to his metaphysical and moral writings in three key ways. First, there are many more responses to his religious writings, undoubtedly because of the perceived threat that they posed. Second, critics of Hume’s other writings frequently misunderstood his views; however, as professionally trained theologians, the respondents to Hume’s religious writings typically had a good grasp of his arguments, even if they did not offer convincing refutations. Third, although all early responses to Hume are intrinsically interesting, the responses to his religious writings are invaluable for helping decipher Hume’s frequently concealed attacks on religion. Having the advantage of living during Hume’s time, early critics understood Hume’s implications better than we might today. And, in their responses, they routinely interpret Hume’s hidden meaning.
The first early response to “Of Miracles” appeared in 1749 by Philip Skelton, and a steady stream of responses has continued to the present time. The longest of these were by William Adams (1752), John Leland (1755), and George Campbell (1762). Although Hume avoided responding to his critics as a matter of principle, he nevertheless kept track of printed criticisms as they appeared. In the last decade of his life he wrote “I cou’d cover the Floor of a large Room with Books and Pamphlets wrote against me.” His interest in critical responses to “Of Miracles” in particular started early. Writing to his friend Robert Wallace in 1753, Hume stated that he saw three pamphlets that attacked “Of Miracles,” two of which he owned. Some time later, Hume told Richard Kirwan that “twenty-two answers had been made [to "Of Miracles"], hinting, that if any of them had been satisfactory any other would have been judged superfluous” (“Remarks”, included below). In addition to works devoted exclusively to “Of Miracles”, critics of Hume’s other writings on religion routinely included brief attacks on that essay. Some critics attacked a single point in his essay, whereas others carefully dissected the work sentence by sentence. The respondents were typically acquainted with the critiques of Hume that appeared prior to their own, and they often stated their intention to offer a new angle in their attack.
The principal objections raised by respondents regarding “Of Miracles” Part 1 are these. (1) Hume’s use of the word “experience” is ambiguous, sometimes meaning an individual’s private experience, other times meaning human collective experience. (2) Our limited experience of natural laws does not make it unreasonable to believe that God altered natural laws. (3) Miraculous intervention is reasonable to believe when we recognise God’s existence, God’s nature, and God’s interest in redeeming humanity. (4) Contrary to Hume, it is perfectly reasonable for the Indian prince to believe that water freezes, even though his limited experience suggests otherwise. (5) Experience of natural laws is not as weighty as Hume maintains since some commonly believed laws are overturned by a single experiment. (6) Strong testimony of miracles can in fact outweigh our experience of consistent natural laws. (7) Hume misconstrues the notion of probability when stating that we “subtract” contrary evidences from each other. (8) Hume’s argument tells us only that miracles are highly unusual, which believers in miracles already acknowledge.
Concerning Part 2, these are the main objections. (1) The New Testament miracles were not in fact reported by ignorant people in a barbarous nation. (2) Miracle testimonies from rival religions do not nullify each other; upon examination, the New Testament miracles are the only ones that are credible. (3) Contrary to Hume, Muhammad never claimed to have performed miracles. (4) The alleged miracle done by Vespasian is not credible since it was done in front of gullible people with a clear political aim. (5) The alleged miracle at Saragossa was not thoroughly investigated by Cardinal de Retz, and it is likely that the man in question had a wooden leg. (6) Hume exaggerates the number and nature of the alleged miracles at the tomb of the Abbé De Pâris; the most notable ones were either frauds or the result of natural healings, as exposed by De Voeux in his Lettres sur les Miracles (1735) and Critique Generale du livre de Mr. de Montgeron (1741).
Early responses to “Of a Particular Providence” were more modest in number, and written by some of Hume’s most notable critics: Henry Home (1751), George Anderson (1753), George Psalmanazar (1753), John Leland (1755), James Beattie (1770), James Oswald (1772), Joseph Priestley (1780), and Archibald Arthur (1803). Their main objection was with Hume’s claim that our knowledge of God as creator is limited to the effects that we see in the creation. When Hume’s “Natural History of Religion” appeared in 1757, four reviews of that work shortly followed, most of which found the work to be less original than Hume’s other writings. The most sustained critiques of the “Natural History of Religion” were written by Caleb Fleming (1757), William Warburton (1757), Thomas Stona (1758), Voltaire (1764-1769), and Duncan Shaw (1776). Most of these writers focused on Hume’s claim that polytheism was the original religion of humanity.
When Hume’s Dialogues was published in 1777, at least six reviews of that work appeared, the majority of which were very critical. Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, books, pamphlets and journal articles appeared that analyzed different parts of the Dialogues, but the most systematic studies of that work only appeared later in the 20th century. The early responses to the Dialogues presented in this volume are by Thomas Hayter (1780), Joseph Priestley (1780), Joseph Milner (1781), John Ogilvie (1783), Hugh Hamilton (1784), George Horne (1784), Archibald Arthur (1803), and Alexander Crombie (1829). “Of Suicide” and “Of the Immortality of the Soul” were openly published in 1783 with Hume’s name attached, and most respondents were shocked by these essays. In fact, we find here some of the most negative comments about Hume that have appeared in print. Four review articles attacked the work, and parts of the essays were analyzed by the anonymous An Essay on the Immortality of the Soul (1784), and Charles Moore’s A Full Inquiry into the Subject of Suicide (1790). The most systematic study of “Of Suicide” was presented by George Horne (1784).
